Is Procrastination Weakness of Will?

This week, I discuss an interesting philosophical perspective on procrastination and the notion of "weakness of will." The content for my discussion comes from a chapter written by Sarah Stroud (McGill University) in "The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination" (2004: Oxford University Press). I took the title of my podcast from her chapter with the same title. It's an interesting topic, and my discussion takes us from the Greek notion of Akrasia up to more recent definitions and understandings of weakness of will. Yes, procrastination is a weakness of will, but there are various issues to consider, particularly this notion of intention.

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Here's more about Dr. Stroud taken from "The Thief of Time"
Sarah Stroud is Associate Professor of Philosophy at McGill University in Montreal. Her research interests range across moral psychology, moral and practical reasoning, moral theory, and metaethics; she is currently working on partiality in moral psychology and moral theory. With Christine Tappolet, she coedited Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (2003/2007), and she recently contributed the entry on weakness of will to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Her work has appeared in Ethics and Philosophy and Public Affairs , among other journals. She is one of two associate editors of the International Encyclopedia of Ethics , now under preparation for Wiley-Blackwell with Hugh LaFollette as editor-in-chief, to be published in 9 to 12 volumes in 2012.